[Vision2020] Neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga: "Who’s in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain."

[Joe Campbell]

Interesting stuff Ted. Thanks. Let me process this and get back to you. I
have an angiogram scheduled in Spokane tomorrow, so it might not be soon.

It is important to distinguish between the empirical facts (the science)
and the modal arguments (the philosophical logic, which is my area). "If
you have no control over A, and B is caused by A, then you have no control
over B" is a spurious argument. If all of our actions need to be the
product over things we control, then it isn't just we humans that lack
control. No creature could possibly have control. For how can anything be
the cause of itself? But in the passages below you note that what the
science shows is that some of us humans have more control than others. If
you put it all together, this view is problematic. This is precisely the
kind of stuff philosophers can help sort out. In fact, that is what I
attempt to do in my research.

More to come. Wish me well! Best, Joe

On Sun, Jan 8, 2012 at 9:09 PM, Ted Moffett <starbliss at gmail.com> wrote:

> Thanks for this extensive response.  Way beyond the call of duty for
> Vision2020, I think.
>
> I thought you might be familiar with Gazzaniga's work, and if he added
> anything new to the "free will" discussion with his new book on this
> issue, published Nov. 2011.  But you stated if I understand correctly
> you are not familiar with his work.
>
> An hour interview with Gazzaniga regarding the new book in question is
> viewable here:
>
> http://www.booktv.org/Program/13035/After+Words+Michael+Gazzaniga+Whos+in+Charge+Free+Will+and+the+Science+of+the+Brain+hosted+by+Sally+Satel.aspx
>
> I think it probable that neuroscience will make substantial
> discoveries, and if I understand correctly you would not disagree,
> that will more clearly define who does or does not have reduced powers
> or capacities, assuming your compatibilist view that "free will is a
> set of active powers and cognitive capacities and that these powers
> and capacities are consistent with a fully determined world."
>
> We already recognize a variety of mental (brain?) conditions (bipolar
> disorder, schizophrenia, multiple personality disorder) to mitigate
> guilt or full responsibility for misconduct.  People criminally guilty
> of some crimes today may in the future due to neuroscience
> advancements be found to have committed crimes while they were
> suffering scientifically verifiable neurologically based impairments.
>
> Indeed, in the interview referenced above Gazzaniga is quoted
> regarding "neuroscience oozing into the courtroom," but he cautioned
> that some of this neuroscience is not ready for this application,
> though it is likely that eventually some of it will be, or at least
> claimed to be.  In the interview mention of reliable lie detection
> with further advancements in neuroscience is discussed, a possibility
> that if scientifically validated would be a major and alarming,
> perhaps, breakthrough.
>
> Also, Gazzaniga presents studies indicating very young children
> already have forms of moral reasoning manifesting in their behavior,
> that in some sense is programmed into the brain (my wording). He
> emphatically implied that the tabula rasa approach to the human brain
> is false (my wording again).
>
> If stating "my neurons are in control" is not a threat to your view of
> free will, then with advancements in neuroscience eventually a brain
> state of "free will" may be empirically defined with replicatable peer
> reviewed experimental studies that offers the capacity to
> scientifically detect if such a state is or is not present in the
> brain.  Of course a problem applying this evidence to the commission
> of crimes is that the actual state of brain when a crime was committed
> is not likely to be available as evidence in a courtroom.  Someone may
> at a later time display a brain state indicating free will is present,
> but when the crime was committed their brain might have displayed an
> absense of this capacity.  This problem was mentioned in the C-Span2
> BookTV interview with Gazzaniga.  This already is a problem in trials
> where there is a claim of mental impairment when a crime was
> committted, though the accused appears "sane" later.
>
> I wonder if "Will" is dependent on genetic factors, with some
> possessing a strong will and others not, just as physical capacities
> vary considerably based on genetics.  Actually, it seems plausible
> this is the case.
>
> I once told someone that the fact in my late 30s I ran Bloomsday at a
> 5:58 minute per mile average for the 7.46 mi. 12 K. race (29th out of
> 2900 in my age group) was nothing I should accept praise for.  My
> genetics allowed me to do this, something I had no control over.  Many
> others no doubt worked as hard or harder than I did, yet their
> genetics limited their capacity, while truly world class runners ran
> at a sub-5 minute per mile pace, only possible for the extremely
> genetically blessed, thus literally impossible for me to match.  If
> only I was that blessed!
>
> If some individuals simply are weak willed, due to genetics, thus
> having much less control over their impulses, while some are
> genetically blessed with a strong will, and thus more capacity for
> virtue, this is a questionable basis for blame or praise, it seems to
> me.
>
> Regarding environmental influences on behavior, many of which are not
> under our control, especially while children, the following song at
> least emotionally captures a more compassionate rather than
> judgemental view of the failures of the human condition:
> Joan Baez singing Phil Och's "There But For Fortune:"
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S4BYOJ1tc-k
> ---------------------------
> The following book review from the "Wall Street Journal" on
> Gazzaniga's "Who's in Charge?" discusses a kind of biological
> reductionism, that is a basis to argue against some definitions of
> free will, and objections to this view.  I'm not sure the author of
> this review quite correctly understands Gazzaniga's position on these
> issues, but he presents some amazing theories, and states:
> ---One of the founding fathers of cognitive psychology, Jerry Fodor,
> has argued that to solve the puzzle of conscious experience "there's
> hardly anything we may not have to cut loose from."---
>
> Exactly.
>
>
> http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204618704576642991109496396.html
>
> NOVEMBER 12, 2011
>
> Rethinking Thinking
>
> How a lumpy bunch of tissue lets us plan, perceive, calculate,
> reflect, imagine—and exercise free will.
>
> By RAYMOND TALLIS
>
> The world of academe is currently in the grip of a strange and
> worrying epidemic of biologism, which has also captured the popular
> imagination. Scientists, philosophers and quite a few toilers in the
> humanities believe—and would have the rest of us believe—that nothing
> fundamental separates humanity from animality.
>
> Biologism has two cardinal manifestations. One is the claim that the
> mind is the brain, or the activity of the brain, so that one of the
> most powerful ways to advance our understanding of ourselves is to
> look at our brains in action, using the latest scanning devices. The
> other is the claim that Darwinism explains not only how the organism
> Homo sapiens came into being (as, of course, it does) but also what
> motivates people and shapes their day-to-day behavior.
>
> These beliefs are closely connected. If the brain is an evolved organ,
> shaped by natural selection to ensure evolutionary success (as it most
> surely is), and if the mind is the brain and nothing more, then the
> mind and all those things we are minded to do can be explained by the
> evolutionary imperative. The mind is a cluster of apps or modules
> securing the replication of the genes that are expressed in our
> bodies.
>
> Many in the humanities have embraced these views with astonishing
> fervor. New disciplines, prefixed by "neuro" or "evolutionary" or even
> "neuro-evolutionary," have been invented. "Neuro-aesthetics" explains
> aesthetic pleasure in terms of activity in certain parts of the brain
> observed when people are enjoying works of art. A propensity for
> aesthetic brain-tingles, implanted in us by evolution, causes us to
> tingle to the right kinds of things, such as pictures of landscapes
> loaded with food.
>
> "Neuro-economics" can explain why we buy things we don't need or can't
> afford, by identifying ancestral imbalances between the want-it center
> in the amygdala, deep in the cerebral hemispheres, and the
> wait-until-you-can-afford-it center in the prudent frontal lobes.
> Those toxic subprime mortgages, it appears, were in fact "neurotoxic."
> Conspicuous consumption and our trillion-dollar debts are due to a
> desire to advertise our genetic health, analogous to a peacock
> virtually crippled by its meretricious tail.
>
> A brain in good working order is, of course, a necessary condition of
> every aspect of human consciousness, from basic perception to the most
> complex constructed sense of self. It does not follow that this is the
> whole story of our nature—that we are just brains in some kind of
> working order. Many aspects of everyday human consciousness elude
> neural reduction. For we belong to a boundless, infinitely elaborated
> community of minds that has been forged out of a trillion cognitive
> handshakes over hundreds of thousands of years. This community is the
> theater of our daily existence. It separates life in the jungle from
> life in the office, and because it is a community of minds, it cannot
> be inspected by looking at the activity of the solitary brain.
>
> Biologism commands acceptance in the humanities because it is promoted
> or endorsed by scientists whose prowess in their chosen field seems to
> qualify them to pronounce on what are essentially philosophical
> questions. Thus it is notable when two books written by
> neuro-biologists of the greatest distinction are nonetheless critical
> of the simplifications—both scientific and philosophical—of biologism.
> Both authors look outside the conceptual frameworks upon which
> biologism depends.
>
> "Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged From Matter" by Terrence Deacon,
> a professor of neuroscience and anthropology at the University of
> California, Berkeley, does not deliver on its subtitle, but the author
> acknowledges the depth and complexity of the problem. This mighty work
> of scholarship is long, slow-moving and peppered with neologisms, but
> it is infinitely preferable to the flashy tomes of the Professors of
> Legerdemain who assure us that the mind could emerge from matter in
> the brain "just like that" simply because "the brain is the most
> complex object in the world."
>
> Along the way, Mr. Deacon demolishes fashionable computational
> theories of the brain.  Anyone in the future who is tempted to assert
> that "the mind is the software of the brain" should reflect on Mr.
> Deacon's observation that the apparent agency of a computer "is just
> the displaced agency of some human designer." The use of simplistic
> analogies to make the mind look machine-like and machines mind-like
> and thereby solve the mind-brain problem should never again pass
> unchallenged.
>
> In his approach to the question of how sentience emerged from "dumb"
> and "numb" matter, Mr. Deacon mobilizes some radically new ideas,
> taking us back to thermodynamics to show how it might have happened.
> His key argument, developed over several hundred pages, centers on
> what he calls a "teleo-dynamic" system—a self-organizing system that
> "promotes its own persistence and maintenance" by modifying itself "to
> more effectively utilize supportive extrinsic conditions." He suggests
> how such a system might spontaneously arise out of thermodynamic
> processes, as predicted by chaos theory.
>
> Living organisms are such self-organizing teleodynamic systems, and
> they have a key property. He calls this the absential. An absential is
> a phenomenon "whose existence is determined with respect to an . . .
> absence." This sounds somewhat opaque but captures something essential
> to mind. In the push-pull universe of mechanical causation, only that
> which is present shapes the course of events. In our lives, by
> contrast, we are always taking account of things that are no longer
> present or not yet present or that may never come to pass. Thus
> "absentials" include our beliefs, the norms to which we subscribe and
> those great silos of possibility such as "tomorrow" and "next year."
>
> But absentials long precede human consciousness, Mr. Deacon claims. All
> "teleodynamic systems" are shaped and defined, in great part, by the
> constraints placed on their development. The constraints are evident
> in the directed development of organisms or the limited patterns of
> behavior they may exhibit: Living matter is, as it were, "railroaded"
> along certain paths. It is through these constraints that, ultimately,
> "that which is not" asserts its power. Mind emerged not from matter,
> Mr. Deacon concludes, but from the constraints on matter. These
> constraints then shaped the emergence of brand-new "higher level"
> properties—mind and thought—that are not susceptible to reduction.
>
> This argument is not entirely persuasive, precisely because Mr. Deacon
> sees absentials as defining properties of both life and mind, reaching
> all the way down to brainless organisms, to which he, surprisingly,
> ascribes sentience. But brainless complex systems do not experience
> their own development, or the constraints on their development, in the
> way that you or I experience the possibilities that shape or constrain
> our behavior. Mr. Deacon acknowledges that the form of sentience found
> in animals is different from that of humans but asserts somewhat
> gnomically that it is "a form of sentience built on sentience."
>
> The author thus takes us from matter to life, but still not from life
> to mind, even less to the human mind. He asserts that specifically
> human consciousness emerges from "the flux of intercellular signals
> that neurons give rise to"— without making it clear how this happens.
> The word "signals" jumps out: Elsewhere the author criticizes the
> homunculi (little men), making quite difficult determinations, that
> pervade putative neuroscientific accounts of the mind; there is more
> than a hint of a homunculus in the notion of neurons that "signal" to
> one another. We are back with the old ways of thinking, manifested by
> a tendency to generate persons from the material world simply by
> personifying what is happening in living matter.
>
> One of the founding fathers of cognitive psychology, Jerry Fodor, has
> argued that to solve the puzzle of conscious experience "there's
> hardly anything we may not have to cut loose from." Mr. Deacon has not
> cut loose from quite enough yet—in particular from the notion that
> matter organized in a certain way must be mindful—but he has started
> to reframe the terms of the discussion. His 500 densely argued pages
> testify to his awareness of the intractability of the problem.
>
> Where Mr. Deacon looks backward to thermodynamics for answers about
> the mind, Michael Gazzaniga's "Who's in Charge?" suggests that we look
> elsewhere—outward, to the human world beyond the stand-alone brain.
> Mr. Gazzaniga is a towering figure in contemporary neurobiology. It
> was he who, back in the 1970s, coined the term "cognitive
> neuroscience"—with colleague George Miller—in the back seat of a New
> York taxi.
>
> Unlike many in his profession, Mr. Gazzaniga is philosophically
> sophisticated. He believes that, while the brain "enables" the mind,
> mental activity is not reducible to neural events. While he states
> that thoughts, perceptions, memories, intentions and the exercise of
> the will are emergent phenomena, he adds that "calling a property
> emergent does not explain it or how it came to be."
>
> Crucially, the true locus of this activity is not in the isolated
> brain but "in the group interactions of many brains," which is why
> "analyzing single brains in isolation cannot illuminate the capacity
> of responsibility." This, the community of minds, is where our human
> consciousness is to be found, woven out of the innumerable
> interactions that our brains make possible. "Responsibility" (or lack
> of it), Mr. Gazzaniga says, "is not located in the brain." It is "an
> interaction between people, a social contract"—an emergent phenomenon,
> irreducible to brain activity.
>
> If the mind really were identical with activity in individual
> brain-bits, which were themselves machines causally wired into the
> material world, free will would be an illusion. One purpose of Mr.
> Gazzaniga's book is to reveal the implications of this mistaken notion
> for one of the most sinister of the neuro-prefixed pseudo-disciplines:
> "neuro-law." Neuro-law aims to replace the untidy processes of the
> current judicial system with something more biologically savvy. Isn't
> criminal behavior the result of (abnormal) brain function? If so, the
> brain, not the defendant, should take the rap.
>
> Mr. Gazzaniga will have none of this, and he deplores "neuroscience
> oozing into the courtroom." The author savages the uncritical use of
> neuro-technology in court and ¬laments that juries and judges have
> little idea of the shakiness of the connections ¬between minor
> abnormalities on brain scans and the commission of a particular crime.
> Neuro-law is not merely premature; it overlooks the fact that, as Mr.
> Gazzaniga says, "we are people, not brains," and brain scans tell us
> little about our personhood.
>
> Mr. Gazzaniga's incomparable knowledge, along with his mastery of the
> art of making things clear without oversimplifying them, means that
> "Who's in Charge?" is a joy to read. Is his book, along with Mr.
> Deacon's, an indicator that the mighty edifice of philosophically
> naïve conventional neuroculture is starting to fall apart? Are these
> books harbingers of a better future in which the task of trying to
> make sense of what we are is not hampered by a reductive scientism
> that identifies us with the activity of brains evolved to serve
> evolutionary success? I hope so. While we are not angels fallen from
> heaven, we are not just neural machines. Nor are we merely
> exceptionally clever chimps.
>
> —Dr. Tallis's latest book is "Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis
> and the Misrepresentation of Humanity" (Acumen).
> ------------------------------------------
> Vision2020 Post: Ted Moffett
>
> On 1/2/12, Joe Campbell <philosopher.joe at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Meant to post this to everyone.
> >
> > On Sun, Jan 1, 2012 at 10:16 PM, Joe Campbell
> > <philosopher.joe at gmail.com>wrote:
> >
> >> Thanks for the very interesting post Ted. I'll have to read this a bit
> >> closer and read the links but here are a few thoughts on the topic.
> >>
> >> 1/ I think the neuroscience research is very interesting and very
> >> important. I'm familiar with some of it but I need to read more about it
> >> before I can make an informed decision. There is a conference in Florida
> >> State later this month and I'm toying with the idea of going to it
> since I
> >> have a bit of travel money left for the semester.
> >>
> >> Whether neuroscience research tells us something new about the free will
> >> debate is not clear and it depends on your views on free will and which
> >> issues surrounding the free will debate are the important issues. Here
> are
> >> are three main theories:
> >>
> >>
> >>    - Free will skepticism (or antirealism or denialism) is the view that
> >>    no one has free will.
> >>    - Compatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with
> >>    determinism. If you combine this with the view that we have free will
> >> and
> >>    determinism is true, the view is called "soft determinism."
> >>    - Libertarianism is incompatibilism (free will is not compatible with
> >>    free will) combined with the view that we have free will (and thus
> >>    determinism is false).
> >>
> >> Most free will skeptics think that results from neuroscience confirm
> their
> >> view. This is a very popular view among contemporary free will scholars,
> >> and that is one reason why the neuroscience research is relevant to the
> >> contemporary debate.
> >>
> >> Suppose you are a libertarian. Likely you're not impressed by
> neuroscience
> >> discoveries. The reason is that all of the correlations discovered so
> far
> >> are statistical. Since neuroscience discoveries don't entail determinism
> >> and many libertarians are convinced that only determinism is threatening
> >> to
> >> free will (God's foreknowledge for instance is not threatening according
> >> to
> >> many libertarians), few libertarians think the research is important.
> >>
> >> I'm a compatibilist: I think that free will is a set of active powers
> and
> >> cognitive capacities and that these powers and capacities are consistent
> >> with a fully determined world. Since I don't think that determinism is a
> >> threat to free will, I certainly don't think that the kinds of
> statistical
> >> correlations established by neuroscience are a threat either.
> >> To give you some idea of my view think of a simple capacity like the
> >> ability to partake in means-to-ends reasoning. This I think is essential
> >> to
> >> both free will and moral responsibility. This is why I don't think dogs
> >> have free will but some people do (small children for instance do not).
> >> Note that the capacity to partake in means-to-ends reasoning is not the
> >> only capacity relevant to free will. It's just one example.
> >>
> >> It seems odd to think that a capacity like means-to-ends reasoning can
> >> only exist if determinism is false. Likewise, it is doubtful that
> research
> >> in neuroscience will reveal that we don't really have the capacity.
> Rather
> >> it will help us to understand how this capacity is manifested and thus
> >> actually help us to understand the nature of free will. I am a
> naturalist
> >> about free will and just as science can help us understand the natural
> >> world it can help us understand its "philosophical" aspects, like free
> >> will.
> >>
> >> My meta-project in philosophy is to promote naturalist views about
> >> traditional philosophical concepts, for example self, free will, and
> God.
> >> These are distinct from what I call "transcendental views." Examples
> would
> >> be the self is an immaterial soul, free will is incompatible with
> >> determinism, and God's existence transcends our earthly existence. I
> think
> >> skeptical opinions result from the acceptance of some transcendental
> view
> >> as the defining characteristic of a philosophical concept combined with
> >> the
> >> belief that the transcendence is not possible, or there is reason to
> think
> >> it is false. My response all cases is to deny the first move. Free will
> is
> >> not some spooky power that suddenly emerges in human beings a some point
> >> in
> >> their development. It is the collection of natural powers and capacities
> >> that naturally develop during the life of the average person. That's why
> >> we
> >> don't (or shouldn't) hold babies responsible for anything, why we hold
> >> children responsible for some but not all things, and why we hold
> "normal"
> >> adults responsible for more things than children. As we grow we develop
> >> more complex powers and capacities.
> >>
> >> 2/ I want to make another comment, just about the title of Gazzaniga's
> >> book: "Who's in Charge?" Suppose I say, rather crudely, "my neurons are
> in
> >> charge." How is this a threat? As a naturalist, I think that I'm a
> >> physical
> >> thing made up of neurons among other things. I do things in part because
> >> my
> >> neurons do things. You need a transcendental view of the self to get the
> >> threat going.
> >>
> >> 3/ You're correct that there is no generally agreed upon definition of
> >> free will. The one I establish in my book is that a person has free will
> >> if
> >> and only if some of his actions are up to him, or within his control.
> Then
> >> you can understand the above theories as attempting to flesh out the
> >> consequences of what it means to say that actions are within the control
> >> of
> >> persons. Can we have control over our actions if determinism is true,
> for
> >> instance? I think "yes." Of course, not all people have control over
> their
> >> actions and control often comes in degrees. On my view, control is a
> >> function of active powers and cognitive capacities. Diminished or
> >> underdeveloped capacities suggests a kind of lack of control and that
> >> suggests a diminished level of responsibility.
> >>
> >> I think it is debatable whether we hold animals "responsible" for
> >> anything. But you can't infer that we do just because they suffer
> >> sanctions. We might kill a dog for having rabies but we'd do it whether
> or
> >> not we think his getting the rabies was within his control. The
> important
> >> concepts behind moral responsibility are praiseworthiness or
> >> blameworthiness. Is a dog blameworthy for biting an individual? I think
> >> sometimes a dog might be responsible for such an action, so it is
> possible
> >> that we do hold animals responsible. But what about insects? When you
> >> spray
> >> some ants with a can of raid certainly you are punishing them. But do
> you
> >> blame them in anyway? And if you did blame the ants, would they be
> worthy
> >> of the blame? That seems a little odd. Ants are not morally responsible
> >> for
> >> anything, though perhaps they have active powers.
> >>
> >> 4/ Singleton was a monster. I remember the case well. I'm generally
> >> against capital punishment but not because I feel sorry for people like
> >> Singleton. It strikes me as wrong to kill people (generally speaking)
> and
> >> two wrongs don't make a right. But this is a complex issue of course.
> >> Nonetheless, of course Singleton deserved to be incarcerated and for a
> >> longer time than he was prior to his initial release. As you say, that
> can
> >> be justified for purely pragmatic reasons. But was he responsible for
> his
> >> actions? Was worthy of blame? That is less clear to me. I don't have
> >> enough
> >> about his psychological makeup to make a valid judgement about this. It
> >> says below that he might have had a "bad brain" and was unable to
> inhibit
> >> his naturally aggressive tendencies." Depending on whether this is true
> >> and
> >> whether his inability to inhibit his actions was a result of diminished
> >> cognitive capacities, it might be that he was not blameworthy for his
> >> heinous crimes. The issue of blame can rest on the awful nature of the
> >> crimes. If a child dies in a hurricane that is a horrible event. But it
> >> would be silly to blame the hurricane. Hurricanes don't have the kind of
> >> stuff one needs to be blameworthy. It might be that monsters like
> >> Singleton
> >> don't either. (My own view, based on what I know, is that he is
> >> blameworthy. But I don't know enough about the facts here.)
> >>
> >> I think moral responsibility comes in degrees. So it isn't so much that
> >> folks like Singleton can never be blamed. A better thought is that there
> >> might be mitigating circumstances. We hold children responsible but not
> >> fully responsible for some of their actions. And perhaps we should do
> the
> >> same for psychopaths. And for the same reason. The capacities needed for
> >> full free will are diminished. My own view is that active powers play a
> >> big
> >> role in free will. So most people are at least somewhat responsible for
> >> the
> >> things they do. As long as we can act, likely we have some degree of
> >> control over our actions.
> >>
> >> But you can justify Singleton's incarceration even if he was not morally
> >> responsible for his actions, for pragmatic reasons if nothing else.
> There
> >> is no one-to-one correlation between theories of moral responsibility
> and
> >> theories of incarceration. But it is correct to note that free will
> >> skepticism does not necessarily undermine our criminal justice system.
> (I
> >> have separate criticisms of our criminal justice system that I'll save
> for
> >> a different time.)
> >>
> >> One reason I believe in free will is I think some people are clearly out
> >> of control while others are clearly not. Free will skepticism would not
> >> allow us to distinguish these folks in any relevant way. You might say
> >> "Why
> >> not just switch to the word 'control' and get rid of the word 'free
> >> will'."
> >> But that is to confuse concepts with words. It is the concept that is
> >> important. Sure you can dispense with talking about free will but you
> >> can't
> >> dispense with distinguishing the difference between folks who have no
> >> control of their actions from folks who do; you can't get away from the
> >> fact that some people are blameworthy and some are not.
> >>
> >> 5/ A completely utilitarian justification of punishment will not work.
> >> Note that punishment and incarceration are not necessarily the same
> thing.
> >> punishment seems to imply blame. Suppose you are a free will skeptic and
> >> think that Singleton's punishment is justified because it leads to the
> >> greatest good for everyone. Why then does it matter whether he actually
> >> committed the particular crime for which he was arrested? If we agree
> that
> >> he's a scumbag, wouldn't that alone justify us in his incarceration if
> all
> >> we cared about was the greatest good for everyone? Why shouldn't police
> >> just round up the worst people we can find whenever a crime is
> committed.
> >> This would seem to be justified by a purely consequentialist view. It
> >> seems
> >> to me that an important fact in the incarceration of Singleton was that
> he
> >> was the one who did the heinous act. But if he had no control over his
> >> actions, it isn't clear that he was the one who did it.
> >>
> >> On Sun, Jan 1, 2012 at 4:23 PM, Ted Moffett <starbliss at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >>> I listened to an interview recently with neuroscientist Michael
> >>> S. Gazzaniga, author of the new book, "Who’s in Charge?: Free Will and
> >>> the Science of the Brain."  Publish Date: November 15, 2011:
> >>>
> >>>
> http://ebookstore.sony.com/ebook/michael-s-gazzaniga/who-s-in-charge/_/R-400000000000000529963
> >>>
> >>> Given the recent return to Vision2020 of a local scholar who has
> >>> considerable expertise on this subject, perhaps he can expound on
> >>> whether he thinks Gazzaniga has added anything new to the discussion
> >>> of this subject.
> >>>
> >>> The interview was fascinating, though as I noted before on Vision2020
> >>> regarding "free will," I find the concept confounding, do not claim to
> >>> know how to define it; and Gazzaniga has not resolved this lack of
> >>> clarity.
> >>>
> >>> I started this post several days ago.  But today I discovered that at
> >>> 6 PM PST tonight, on BookTV C-Span2, Gazzaniga will be interviewed
> >>> regarding the very book referenced in this post:
> >>>
> >>>
> http://www.booktv.org/Program/13035/After+Words+Michael+Gazzaniga+Whos+in+Charge+Free+Will+and+the+Science+of+the+Brain+hosted+by+Sally+Satel.aspx
> >>>
> >>> What is especially amazing, it seems to me, is that so many
> >>> people are confident they know what free will is and that most
> everybody
> >>> definately possesses this capacity, most every moment of our waking, at
> >>> least,
> >>> lives, thus justifying revenge and retribution of various cruel kinds
> >>> for misconduct.  For most everyone to understand the complexities
> >>> involved in the concept of "free will" is perhaps like saying most
> >>> everyone has PhD. level understanding in nuclear physics!
> >>>
> >>> Note I am not suggesting abandoning assigning responsibility and
> >>> mitigation for misconduct, regardless of any deficiencies in the
> >>> understanding of free will.  How many people think dogs possess "free
> >>> will?" But if a dog is inclinded to bite or has bitten humans, the dog
> >>> is often held "responsible," and either trained not to bite (domestic
> >>> violence counseling, as a human parallel), be muzzled or sequestered
> >>> (jail, prison), or executed, often without an intention to take
> >>> revenge for a canine moral failing based on "free will."
> >>>
> >>> The following article by Gazzaniga explores some of these issues:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2011/11/neuroscientist_michael_s_gazzaniga_explains_why_some_people_may_be_born_criminals_.single.html
> >>>
> >>> Not Guilty by Reason of Neuroscience: Some people’s brains may doom
> them
> >>> to
> >>> a life of crime.
> >>>
> >>> By Michael S. Gazzaniga
> >>>
> >>> http://www.slate.com/authors.michael_s_gazzaniga.html
> >>>
> >>> Posted Tuesday, Nov. 15, 2011, at 11:17 AM ET
> >>>
> >>> From the book "Who’s in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the
> >>> Brain", by Michael S. Gazzaniga. Copyright © 2011 by Michael S.
> >>> Gazzaniga.
> >>> Reprinted by permission of Ecco, an imprint of HarperCollins
> Publishers.
> >>>
> >>> On Feb. 19, 1997, a house painter called 911 in Tampa, Fla. He had
> >>> returned
> >>> unannounced to a client’s house and through a window saw what appeared
> to
> >>> be a naked man throttling a naked woman. When the police arrived, they
> >>> learned the man hadn’t just strangled Roxanne Hayes; he had stabbed the
> >>> mother-of-three multiple times, killing her.
> >>>
> >>> The murderer’s name was Lawrence Singleton; he was 69 years old, and he
> >>> was
> >>> notorious in California, where 19 years before, he had raped a
> >>> 15-year-old
> >>> hitchhiker, Mary Vincent; hacked off her forearms; and left her in a
> >>> canyon
> >>> to die. Two vacationers came across her the next morning, walking naked
> >>> toward the interstate, the stumps of her severed arms raised to prevent
> >>> further blood loss. Vincent’s description of her attacker was so vivid
> >>> that
> >>> it resulted in a police artist’s drawing that his neighbor recognized.
> >>>
> >>> Singleton was tried, found guilty, and given what was the maximum
> >>> sentence
> >>> at the time in California of 14 years. He was released on parole,
> >>> however,
> >>> after eight years of “good behavior,” even though shortly before his
> >>> release a prison psychiatric evaluation read, “Because he is so out of
> >>> touch with his hostility and anger, he remains an elevated threat to
> >>> others’ safety inside and outside prison.” Mary’s mother, Lucy Vincent,
> >>> said that Mary’s father would carry a .45-caliber pistol and often
> >>> contemplated killing Singleton.
> >>>
> >>> Because Singleton had written letters to her lawyer threatening her
> while
> >>> he was in prison, Mary was terrified after his parole. So were
> >>> Californians. Residents of every California town that prison
> authorities
> >>> tried to settle him in staged angry protests. He was finally settled
> in a
> >>> mobile home on the grounds of San Quentin prison until his parole was
> up
> >>> and he moved to Florida.
> >>>
> >>> In 2001 Singleton died of cancer while on death row in Florida. Mary
> >>> Vincent told a reporter that his arrest and death had given her a
> >>> “tremendous feeling of freedom,” but that she still had such vivid
> >>> nightmares (during which she had actually dislocated her shoulder,
> >>> cracked
> >>> ribs, and smashed her nose) that she was afraid to go to sleep.
> Divorced,
> >>> with prostheses that she has modified with spare parts from broken
> >>> refrigerators and stereo systems, she is now an artist struggling to
> >>> support two sons.
> >>>
> >>> While you read this, what were your gut feelings and thoughts about
> Larry
> >>> Singleton? Did you want him to be locked up and never released
> >>> (incapacitation)? If you had been Mary’s father, would you, too, have
> >>> wanted to kill him (retribution)? Or did you want to forgive him, to
> tell
> >>> him that it is too bad his brain was unable to inhibit his naturally
> >>> aggressive tendencies and that perhaps with some treatment he could be
> >>> more
> >>> prosocial (rehabilitation)?
> >>>
> >>> Incapacitation, retribution, or rehabilitation are the three choices
> >>> society has for dealing with criminal behavior. When society considers
> >>> public safety, it is faced with the decision about which perspective
> >>> those
> >>> making and enforcing the laws should take: retribution, an approach
> >>> focused
> >>> on punishment of the individual and just desserts; or
> consequentialism, a
> >>> utilitarian approach that what is right is what has the best
> consequences
> >>> for society.
> >>>
> >>> Neuroscience is beginning to challenge some people’s notions about
> >>> criminal
> >>> behavior and what we should do about it. Determinism—the belief that
> all
> >>> current and future events, actions, decisions, and behavior are caused
> by
> >>> preceding events combined with the laws of nature—disputes
> long-standing
> >>> beliefs about what it means to be responsible for one’s actions; some
> >>> scholars assert the extreme view that humans are never responsible for
> >>> any
> >>> of their actions. These ideas challenge the very foundational rules
> >>> regulating how we live together in social groups. Should people be held
> >>> accountable for their behavior? If they aren’t, it seems that it would
> >>> change behavior for the worse, just as studies show that merely reading
> >>> about determinism results in increased cheating on tests. Is
> >>> accountability
> >>> what keeps us civilized? Neuroscience has more and more to say about
> >>> these
> >>> questions and is already slowly oozing into the courtroom—prematurely,
> to
> >>> the view of most neuroscientists.
> >>>
> >>> Californians thought that Singleton should not have been paroled, and
> >>> they
> >>> didn’t want him in their communities. They also thought that certain
> >>> behavior warranted longer incarceration. They were right, and the
> parole
> >>> board was wrong. More recently, the legal system has been looking to
> >>> neuroscience to provide answers in several different arenas:
> predicting a
> >>> person’s future threat (recidivism), determining for whom treatment is
> >>> possible, and deciding what level of certainty about these
> determinations
> >>> is acceptable. Are some crimes just too horrendous to contemplate
> >>> release?
> >>> Neuroscience is also illuminating why we have the emotional reactions
> >>> that
> >>> we do to antisocial or criminal behavior.
> >>>
> >>> This leads us to the question that if we understand our reactions that
> >>> have
> >>> been honed by evolution, can or should we amend them? Are these
> emotions
> >>> the sculptors of a civilized society? We have our work cut out for us!
> >>>
> >>> The philosopher Gary Watson has pointed out the simple fact that as we
> >>> come
> >>> to think about ourselves, we shape the rules that we decide to live by.
> >>> Primatologists Michael Tomasello and Brian Hare have argued that we
> have
> >>> been domesticating ourselves over thousands of years through
> ostracizing
> >>> and killing those who were too aggressive, in essence removing them
> from
> >>> the gene pool and modifying our social environment. If they’re right,
> >>> then
> >>> we have been making rules for groups to live by and enforcing them
> >>> throughout our evolutionary history. If neuroscientific findings lead
> us
> >>> to
> >>> think differently about ourselves, our behaviors, and motivations,
> about
> >>> the nature of man, about what we are, and about how we should interact;
> >>> then we *may *decide to reconstruct our social framework—and our legal
> >>> structure.
> >>>
> >>> Is our natural inclination for retribution necessary, or is utilitarian
> >>> accountability sufficient? Is punishment justified? These are questions
> >>> that haven’t in any way been answered, but they are brought to the fore
> >>> by
> >>> research on the brain and what it tells us about who we are. We are
> going
> >>> to see that our current legal system has emerged from innate
> intuitions,
> >>> honed by evolution, just as our moral systems have been.
> >>>
> >>> Who Done It: Me or My Brain?
> >>>
> >>> Legal systems serve as a social mediator of dealings between people. We
> >>> should keep in mind the niche construction dynamic when attempting to
> >>> characterize the law and our concepts of justice and punishment,
> formed,
> >>> as
> >>> they were, by the human brain, mind, and cultural interactions. Legal
> >>> systems elaborate rights and responsibilities in a variety of ways. In
> >>> most
> >>> modern-day societies, the laws made by these systems are enforced
> through
> >>> a
> >>> set of institutions as are the consequences of breaking those laws.
> When
> >>> one breaks a law, it is considered to be an offense against the entire
> >>> society, the state, not an individual. Currently, American law holds
> one
> >>> responsible for one’s criminal actions unless one acted under severe
> >>> duress
> >>> (a gun pointed at your child’s head, for instance) or one suffers a
> >>> serious
> >>> defect in rationality (such as not being able to tell right from
> wrong).
> >>> In
> >>> the United States, the consequences for breaking those laws are based
> on
> >>> a
> >>> system of retributive justice, where a person is held accountable for
> his
> >>> crime and is meted out punishment in the form of his “just desserts.”
> But
> >>> new research raises the question: Who do we blame in a crime, the
> person
> >>> or
> >>> the brain? Do we want to hold the person accountable or do we want to
> >>> forgive him because of this determinist dimension of brain function?
> >>>
> >>> From today’s vantage point: It is all about the brain—what it does and
> >>> does
> >>> not do. We are born with an intricate brain slowly developing under
> >>> genetic
> >>> control, with refinements being made under the influence of epigenetic
> >>> factors and activity-dependent learning. It displays structured—not
> >>> random—complexity, with automatic processing, with particular skill
> sets,
> >>> with constraints, and with a capacity to generalize. All of these
> traits
> >>> evolved through natural selection and provide the foundation for a
> myriad
> >>> of cognitive abilities that are separated and represented in different
> >>> parts of the brain. These parts feature distinct but interrelated
> neural
> >>> networks and systems. In short, the brain has distributed systems
> running
> >>> simultaneously and in parallel. It has multiple control systems, not
> just
> >>> one. It appears to be a determined, finely tuned biological machine.**
> >>>
> >>> Neuroscience Oozing Into the Courtroom
> >>>
> >>> The law is complicated and takes into consideration more than just the
> >>> actual crime. For example, the intention of the perpetrator is also
> part
> >>> of
> >>> the equation. Was the act intentional or accidental? In 1963, Lee
> Harvey
> >>> Oswald had the intention of killing President Kennedy when he took his
> >>> concealed rifle to the building along the parade route, waited there
> >>> until
> >>> the president’s motorcade was passing, and shot him. In an Australian
> >>> case
> >>> the following year, however, Robert Ryan was judged not to have had the
> >>> intention to murder when he killed the cashier of a store he had just
> >>> successfully robbed. While leaving the store, he tripped, accidentally
> >>> pulled the trigger of his gun, and shot the cashier.
> >>>
> >>> While movies, books, and television portray crimes ending up in a
> >>> courtroom
> >>> where intention and many other circumstances are examined, very few
> >>> criminal cases actually go to trial, only about 3 percent; most are
> plea
> >>> bargained out. Once we step into the courtroom, the laboratory of
> >>> judicial
> >>> proceedings, neuroscience has an enormous amount to say about the
> >>> goings-on. It can provide evidence that there is unconscious bias in
> the
> >>> judge, jury, prosecutors, and defense attorneys; tell us about the
> >>> reliability of memory and perception with implications for eyewitness
> >>> testimony; and inform us about the reliability of lie detecting. Now
> it’s
> >>> being asked to determine the presence of diminished responsibility in a
> >>> defendant, predict future behavior, and determine who will respond to
> >>> what
> >>> type of treatment. It can even tell us about our motivations for
> >>> punishment.
> >>>
> >>> Robert Sapolsky, professor of psychology at Stanford, makes the
> extremely
> >>> strong statement: “It’s boggling that the legal system’s gold standard
> >>> for
> >>> an insanity defense—M’Naghten—is based on 166-year-old science. Our
> >>> growing
> >>> knowledge about the brain makes notions of volition, culpability, and,
> >>> ultimately, the very premise of a criminal justice system, deeply
> >>> suspect.”
> >>> The M’Naghten rules arose after the attempted assassination of British
> >>> Prime Minister Robert Peel in 1843 and have been used to determine
> (with
> >>> a
> >>> few adjustments) criminal liability in regard to the insanity defense
> in
> >>> most common law jurisdictions ever since. The British Supreme Court of
> >>> Judicature, in answer to one of the questions posed to it by the House
> of
> >>> Lords about the insanity law, responded:
> >>>
> >>> “the jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is presumed to
> >>> be
> >>> sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible
> for
> >>> his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and
> that
> >>> to
> >>> establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
> proved
> >>> that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
> >>> labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
> not
> >>> to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
> >>> know
> >>> it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.”
> >>>
> >>> The question that Sapolsky raises is: Given determinism, given that we
> >>> are
> >>> beginning to understand mental states, given we can track down which
> part
> >>> of the brain is involved in volitional activity and that it may be
> >>> impaired, and our growing knowledge that we can be specific about the
> >>> existence of an impairment and what is causing it, will we view the
> >>> defendant differently?
> >>>
> >>> At stake in the arguments is the very foundation of our legal system,
> >>> which
> >>> holds a person responsible and accountable for his actions. The
> question
> >>> is
> >>> this: Does modern neuroscience deepen our ideas about determinism, and,
> >>> with more determinism, is there less reason for retribution and
> >>> punishment?
> >>> Put differently, with determinism there is no blame, and, with no
> blame,
> >>> there should be no retribution and punishment. This is the simmering
> idea
> >>> that people are worried about. If we change our mind about these things
> >>> as
> >>> a culture, then we are going to change how we deal with this
> unfortunate
> >>> aspect of human behavior involving crime and punishment.
> >>> ------------------------------------------
> >>> Vision2020 Post: Ted Moffett
> >>>
> >>> =======================================================
> >>>  List services made available by First Step Internet,
> >>>  serving the communities of the Palouse since 1994.
> >>>               http://www.fsr.net
> >>>          mailto:Vision2020 at moscow.com
> >>> =======================================================
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >
>
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