[Vision2020] Is John Calvin an Intolerista?

[Michael]

Wayne,

 

That was a good summary of the argument from the problem of evil.  However,
over the last decade or so most philosophers (as I hear) have been uneasy
with such a deductive approach.  The reason is that, well, it doesn't really
work as well as one might have originally expected.  Now, the project is
primarily inductive.  The nature and extent of evil in the world provides
'evidence' for the fact that God does not exist; but of course, as is always
the case with constructing an evidential argument, it is not difficult for
one additional piece of evidence to come in and change the direction of what
they call the inductive 'strength.'  If I sit around all day long and look
at pictures of children mutilated by murderous parents, the evidence for the
fact that a good and all knowing God does not exist would probably begin
seeming a bit strong.  So strong in fact, I might be inclined to think that
'I know' that God does not exist.  After all, when considered in a more
abstract and timeless fashion, the argument from the problem of evil does
begin to make a lot of sense. 

 

However, I also might be inclined to put the pictures down, take a deep
breath, and remind myself of the grand Christian Drama; I might begin
retelling to myself the history of the cosmos from a Christian point of
view.  What I will find there, very likely, is a God who permits, yet also
passionately eradicates, evil:  A God who hates murderers and will punish
them; a God who will raise these broken children up from the grave; a God
who suffered the same treatment that these little children did when he came
to the world.  This sort of evidence can begin seeming even stronger if
combined by a traditional experience of repentance.  In other words, one
might come to believe that the evil is not just 'out there' to be compared
to God, but in one's self.  If there is a problem with evil in me, then a
proposal for a solution to this problem might very well seem a bit more
reasonable.  This is particularly the case if I begin feeling 'guilty' for
evil in me.  But 'guilty' before whom?  Or perhaps I begin feeling
'thankful' for all the good and beautiful things in the world.  But
'thankful' to whom? All these sorts of factors can come in and start making
the existence of God not only possible, but even likely for me-for some,
almost necessary.  

 

However, one thing that struck me reading through your deductive way of
setting up the argument was the reference to the kind of God Christian's
believe.   God is 'all good,' but I've noticed a wild variance between what
biblical Christianity and secular observers mean by 'all good' to begin
with.  I think there might be a bit of begging the question in your
argument, for example, if you assume at the beginning that a God is all good
only if he would not permit evil.  But it seems strange to me to assume the
nature of true eternal 'goodness' going into the question of whether or not
God exists.  This reminds me of a discussion I had with Nick Gier many years
ago..

 

Yours,

Michael Metzler

 

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