[Vision2020] MSD Teacher Salaries

Thu, 12 Jun 2003 11:14:25 -0700

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Visionaries,=20

I have completed my analysis of the actual MSD teacher salaries. Here's =
a
quick look at the summary:=20

 <http://courtneys.us/MSD/images/Picture1.jpg>=20

77% of all MSD teachers are making over $40k per year. In fact, the vast
majority (66%) make between $40-$50k per year range.

 <http://courtneys.us/MSD/images/Picture2.jpg>=20

The graph above only tells part of the story. Teachers are further
compensated in at least three significant ways: significant benefits, a
10-month school year, and extra pay.=20

*=09
Benefits: Teacher benefits account for an additional 28.6% of their =
salary.=20

*=09
Note: in the private sector, fringe benefits are about 15.8% of salary.
Teachers' benefits are significantly better than what most American's
receive or can ever expect.=20

*=09
Annualized Pay: There is also an annualized compensation for the 3 =
months of
opportunity costs during the Summer.=20

*=09
MSD Teachers instruct 168 to 170 days per year for the salary shown =
above
(note: the national average is 180 teaching days per year; MSD teachers
teach 10 days less than the national average).=20

*=09
Having a 10 month school year is a significant benefit. They have the
opportunity to teach Summer School, go on vacations, take other =
employment
opportunities, etc.=20

*=09
Note 1: the average American works 240 days per year -- nearly 30 =
percent
more days than government school teachers for the salary shown above.=20

*=09
Note 2: to compare MSD teacher salaries to the rest of the nation's
salaries, the teacher salaries must be "annualized" -- converted from a
school year to a 12 month scale.=20

*=09
Extra Pay: These salary figures also don't include extra pay for =
coaching
sports, knowledge bowl, directing jazz band, etc.=20

*=09
This extra compensation can be significant (48% again the teacher's base
salary!).=20

*=09
Note: I've not taken into consideration this "extra pay" in the =
compensated
calculations below. It has been next to impossible to get that data from
MSD; but it is significant.=20

Because of their shorter work year and shorter workday,  teachers earn =
more
than many other educated professionals:

 <http://www.educationnext.org/20033/71.html> Figure 1

When you include the 28.6% benefits, other "opportunity costs" (teaching
Summer School; other work/vacation opportunities), the corrected salary =
grid
looks as follows:

 <http://courtneys.us/MSD/images/Picture1a.jpg>=20

So what we really have is the following: Average MSD teacher =
compensation
package (including benefits, annualized salary, bonuses, etc): $63,663.

And the distribution looks like this:=20

 <http://courtneys.us/MSD/images/Picture4.jpg>=20

Despite protestations by the NEA, neither US nor Idaho teachers are =
poverty
stricken. The annualized adjustment, including compensation, show that =
76%
of MSD government school teachers are making between $65,000 and $90,000 =
per
year. Compare this to the fact that the per capita
<http://www.labor.state.id.us/lmi/pubs/idempnews/iecur.pdf> personal =
income
for Idaho was $25,057; for Latah County it was $21,716 (in 1991).

Finally -- why is it important that we deal with teachers' salaries? =
Because
those salaries account for the largest portion of the government school
budget. If we are to get a handle on spending, we have to deal with the
largest contributor to spending -- teachers' salaries.

Jack Wenders (Professor or Economics, University of Idaho) explains the
effects that we see above:

  _____ =20

Dear Dale:

Thank you for sending me your observations about Moscow School =
District's
(MSD) teachers' pay. It is well done. I have a few comments that may =
help
your readers understand what is going on here.=20

1.=09
It is important to understand how teachers' salaries are determined. MSD =
has
a salary grid which rewards only college degrees and credits (in eight
steps) and longevity (in ten steps). Amazingly, teacher classroom
performance and teaching field have nothing to do with how well a =
teacher is
paid. After a very short probationary period, teachers progress up the =
grid
automatically with longevity, even if the grid remains constant. This is =
in
stark contrast to how pay is determined in the private sector, and at =
the
university level, including UI, where there are no grids, and pay =
differs by
teaching field and performance. The bottom end of the 2002-03 MSD salary
grid is $25,000 ($32,150 with benefits) for a first year beginning =
teacher
w/ a BA/BS. There are 80 cells in the grid, and the single top cell is
$48,835 ($62,802 with benefits).
 =20

2.=09
In MSD, there are 165 teachers at or above the bottom cell in 2002-03.
Seventy-four, or 44.8%, of MSD's teachers are in the single top
cell--$48,835 ($62,802 with benefits). Further, 123, or 74.5%, of the
teachers have topped-out in the longevity dimension of the grid and are
located in the top five longevity cells (out of 180). The average salary =
is
$42,842 ($55,094 with benefits), and the median (83rd) salary is $44,634
($57,399 with benefits). The range on the grid is $25k to $48.8k, but =
both
the mean and median are much closer to the top. In an even, or =
rectangular,
distribution, the mean and median salary would be about $36.9k ($47.5k =
with
benefits). What really stands out is the degree to which teachers are =
packed
at the top end of the grid.
 =20

3.=09
In MSD, 89.7% of the teachers making at least $25k in base salary are
tenured. As I read the relevant statute [Idaho Code 33-514], teachers
receive tenure after two years' probation. In most universities, tenure =
is
not achieved until after seven years probation, and there are many
non-tenure track positions. Aside from teachers' aides, there are almost =
no
non-tenure track teaching positions in public education or at MSD. In my
view, achieving a life-time appointment after only a couple of years is =
a
much too short probationary period.
 =20

4.=09
In MSD, 46.1% of the teachers have a MA/MS/MEd degree or more. This is
actually down from 1993-94 when 61.9% of the teachers had a MA/MS/MEd =
degree
or more. For the state as a whole, the comparable number is 19.2% for
2002-03. (MSD's pay grid has a "BA/BS + 30 credits" step where there are
quite a few teachers: 39 teachers are at the top of this step alone. =
Many
apparently take this route up the grid rather than the MA/MS/MEd route.)
 =20

5.=09
In MSD, 35.9% of the teachers are older than fifty. For the state as a
whole, the comparable number is 33.0%. For both MSD and the state, this
percentage has grown by over 70% in the past ten years--up 72% for MSD =
and
up 78% for the state as a whole.
 =20

6.=09
In MSD, 30.2% of the teachers had longevity over 20 years. For the state =
as
a whole, the comparable figure is 26.4%. Over the past ten years, for =
MSD
this figure has grown almost twice as fast as for the state as a =
whole--up
28% as compared to up 16% for the state as a whole.
 =20

7.=09
The upward trend in both age and longevity is understated somewhat for =
both
MSD and the state since teacher numbers have been growing over the past =
ten
years--up 8.3% for MSD and up 15.4% for the state.
 =20

8.=09
What is going on here is roughly the following. Over the past decade or =
so,
with steep gradients in the salary grid, MSD teachers started near the
bottom of the grid, attained tenure quickly, and then rode the steep
longevity and education gradients to the top salary in no more than ten
years. The result has been very low teacher turnover and a bloated,
top-heavy, pay structure. For example, a grid that had top-pay reached =
in,
say, 20 longevity steps instead of 10 would have increased turnover and
saved a lot of salary money over the years, without any loss in teacher
performance. And teachers would have been more evenly distributed over =
the
pay grid. Put another way, no private business, or organization, would =
have
most employees at the top end of the pay scale the way MSD does. Recall =
that
123, or 74.5%, of the teachers are in the top five (out of 80) longevity
cells. It is all the more irrational since the criteria for pay
raises--longevity and additional college credits--have almost nothing to =
do
with improved student performance.
 =20

9.=09
Regarding the longevity dimension of teacher pay. It is often argued =
that
teacher performance improves with experience. This is true, up to a =
point.
Research shows that only the first four or five years of teacher =
experience
has a payoff in student performance. After that, additional experience
doesn't matter, and there is also evidence that some teachers burn-out =
later
in their careers when their performance declines. This also means that
tenure is awarded well before teachers reach their potential. So tenure =
is
rewarded before administrators know how a teacher is going to turn out.
(Again, note that tenure in universities is typically awarded only after
seven years experience when much more is known about how the teacher =
will
turn out, and after that pay can be adjusted to reflect performance, =
unlike
in the public schools.) Think of how absurd it is to have tenure and pay
policies where an employee at age 25 receives tenure for life with no
possibility of being rewarded or penalized for good or bad performance.
Where in the private sector does this happen? Tenure, in and of itself, =
is
not that bad. In Universities, tenured professors who go to sleep can go =
for
years without pay raises. Not so in public education. There, tenure in
combination with an inflexible pay grid locks in and rewards teachers
irrespective of performance. Such a system of pay determination is =
simply
irrational from the standpoint of human resource management.
 =20

10.=09
Regarding pedagogy education. There is a lot of evidence that shows that
education courses, credits, and degrees have nothing to do with teacher
performance, and thus it makes no sense to have pay determined by such
factors. The most important teacher characteristics, from the standpoint =
of
student performance, are: brains (verbal cognitive ability), a few years
experience, and a MA degree (or concentration) in one's teaching field =
at
the secondary level. Teachers themselves regularly cite student teaching =
as
the most important education course they've taken. All the rest is off =
the
radar screen as a determinant of student performance. Yet the way in =
which
teachers are rewarded has almost no connection with these =
characteristics.
Further, many MEd degrees are given in the field of education
administration, a degree which, by design, is not relevant to classroom
teaching, yet it counts on the salary grid. Almost all higher degrees in
education are pursued purely to climb the salary grid, not to improve
teaching--because they don't.
 =20

11.=09
While it is often instructive to annualize teachers' pay for the purpose =
of
comparing it with other kinds of performance, as you have done, in my =
view
the best way to get a handle on public school teachers' relative pay is =
to
compare it to comparable private schools' teachers' pay. This is what is
commonly done in other areas of government employment where the Bureau =
of
Labor Statistics regularly gathers private sector pay for determining
government pay for accountants, computer programmers, engineers, etc. =
Note
that the NEA, IEA, etc, never make comparisons with private sector =
teachers'
pay, for fear of what will be found. The trick used by the teachers' =
unions
in Idaho and elsewhere is to compare public school teachers' pay with =
that
of public school teachers in other states where pay is similarly bloated =
and
top-heavy. Since labor markets are invariably determined by local market
conditions, market pay differentials within the same profession vary =
widely
across regions. While Idaho's teacher pay ranks about 37th among the
states--this rises about 10 places when relative pension match and cost =
of
living are considered, Idaho's per capita personal income ranks about
43-44th among the states. Thus, relative to Idaho's regional personal
incomes, Idaho's teachers on the whole are paid relatively well.)=20

    When public/private teachers' pay comparisons are made, here is what =
is
found.

    Using data from the 1987-88 National Center for Educational =
Statistics
(NCES) Schools and Staffing survey, Ballou and Podgursky found average
public and private school teacher salaries to be $26,458 and $17,434
respectively. In these data, an adjustment was made for teachers who =
were
members of religious orders by excluding all Catholic teachers who were
never married. This shows that private salaries are on the average 65.9% =
of
those in public schools. Similarly, in 1993-94 another study found =
private
school salaries to be 64% of public school teachers'.
    Both these data sets ignore benefits, such as health insurance and
retirement contributions, which are much higher in the public school =
sector.
Benefits are about 31.3% of salary in the public sector as a whole and =
15.8%
in the private sector. A study for Pennsylvania found that teachers'
benefits as a percentage of total salary to be 36.1%, and for comparable
employees in the private sector benefits were 23%. Benefits averaged =
26.2%
of salary for US public school teachers from 1994-995. Public school
teachers' benefits are higher than in private schools.
    These observations raise the issue of the =
optimal--cost-minimizing--mix
of teachers. Apparently, because private schools are under competitive
pressure in their retail markets, they do a better job of choosing the
optimal structural mix of teachers, thus producing an average salary =
well
below those of public schools. Michael Podgursky has addressed the issue =
of
pay comparability between public and private school teachers. Using a =
sample
of non-sectarian, non-specialized, private schools, and controlling for =
sex,
experience, education level, region and rural/urban status, he found =
that
across longevity "pay in private schools begins at 78 percent of public
schools, rises to 92 percent of public school pay by a teacher's twelfth
year, and declines thereafter." Truncating the public school sample to
include only suburban schools with very low poverty rates, which are
comparable to private schools in general, he found that "private schools
teachers now start at 76 percent of their public school counterparts. =
This
rises to 87 percent by their twelfth year and declines thereafter. . . .
[T]he shape of the pay function [over longevity] remains the same but =
simply
shifts downward." The fact that private schools have a teacher turnover =
and
attrition rate about twice that of the public schools indicates that =
private
schools use both teacher "churn" and a much flatter longevity dimension =
in
salary structure to keep average pay down. In contrast, early tenure and =
a
back-loaded salary grid virtually guarantee that the public schools will
have low turnover and attrition and a much higher concentration of =
faculty
at the top of their higher salary grid, exactly like the MSD data show.
Aside from the fact that public schools pay comparable faculty more, =
this
structural difference adds to the higher average pay in public schools.
Simply put, private schools have an inter-temporal, cost-minimizing
longevity mix of teachers than the public schools, including MSD.=20

    For those interested in reading further, you can look at:=20

*=09
Dale Ballou and Michael Podgursky, Teacher Pay and Teacher Quality
(Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1997), =
Table
6.1, p. 131.=20

*=09
Donald H. McLaughlin and Stephen Broughman, Private Schools in the =
United
States: A Statistical Profile (National Center for Education Statistics:
Working Paper NCES 97-459, 1997), Table 3.12, p. 93.=20

*=09
David J. Wynne and Charles W. Watters, "Teacher Compensation: How it
Compares with the Private Sector" Government Union Review 12, No. 3 =
(Summer
1991), Table 2, p. 39.=20

*=09
Michael Podgursky, "Fringe Benefits" Education Next, Vol 3, No. 3 =
(Summer
2003), pp. 71-76.
(http://www.educationnext.org/20033/71.html)=20

    The bottom line is the MDS teachers' pay is both bloated and top-end
loaded. This is due to two factors: (1) paying most teachers well above
their private counterparts in comparable schools, and (2) having a =
top-end
loaded distribution of teachers. For years, the MSD school board has
mismanaged both the level and structure of teachers' pay by its failure =
to
resist the demands of the MEA. Teachers' unions are dominated by senior
members who bargain primarily for their own benefit. The flip side of =
this
is that beginning teachers are largely ignored by union negotiators. In =
the
MSD salary grid, a beginning teacher does not receive any annual raise =
until
the fourth year of longevity.
    Any way you cut it, MSD's teachers are very well paid, and there are =
far
too many at the very top of the salary grid.=20

    I hope these comments help clarify your data and some of the =
underlying
issues. I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have at:
jwenders@uidaho.edu.=20

Regards,
Jack=20
--=20

John T. Wenders
Professor of Economics, University of Idaho
Senior Fellow, The Commonwealth Foundation =20

  _____ =20

More things to discuss in our ongoing conversations about how to best
improve education for Moscow's youth. Throwing more money at the problem
certainly is not the solution.=20

Best,
Dale Courtney
Moscow, Idaho

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<BODY>
<DIV><FONT color=3D#800000>Visionaries,</FONT> </DIV>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>I have completed my analysis of =
the=20
<U>actual</U> MSD teacher salaries. Here's a quick look at the summary:=20
</FONT></P>
<P><A href=3D"images/Picture1.jpg" target=3D_blank><IMG height=3D547=20
src=3D"images/Picture1.jpg" width=3D800 border=3D0></A></P>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>77% of all MSD teachers are =
making over=20
$40k per year. In fact, the <U>vast</U> majority (66%) make between =
$40-$50k per=20
year range.</FONT></P>
<P><A href=3D"images/Picture2.jpg" target=3D_Blank><IMG height=3D490=20
src=3D"images/Picture2.jpg" width=3D751 border=3D0></A></P>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>The graph above only tells =
<U>part</U> of=20
the story. Teachers are further compensated in at least three =
significant ways:=20
<U>significant</U> benefits, a 10-month school year, and extra pay. =
</FONT></P>
<UL>
  <LI>
  <P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000><B>Benefits</B>: Teacher =
benefits account=20
  for an <U>additional</U> 28.6% of their salary.</FONT>=20
  <UL>
    <LI>
    <P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>Note: in the private =
sector, fringe=20
    benefits are about 15.8% of salary. Teachers' benefits are =
significantly=20
    better than what most American's receive or can ever expect.=20
  </FONT></P></LI></UL>
  <LI>
  <P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000><B>Annualized Pay</B>: There =
is also an=20
  annualized compensation for the 3 months of opportunity costs during =
the=20
  Summer. </FONT>
  <UL>
    <LI>
    <P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>MSD Teachers instruct 168 =
to 170 days=20
    per year for the salary shown above (note: the national average is =
180=20
    teaching days per year; MSD teachers teach 10 days less than the =
national=20
    average).</FONT> </P>
    <LI>
    <P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>Having a 10 month school =
year is a=20
    <U>significant</U> benefit. They have the opportunity to teach =
Summer=20
    School, go on vacations, take other employment opportunities, =
etc.</FONT>=20
    </P>
    <LI>
    <P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>Note 1: the average =
American works 240=20
    days per year -- nearly 30 percent more days than government school =
teachers=20
    for the salary shown above. </FONT></P>
    <LI>
    <P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>Note 2: to compare MSD =
teacher salaries=20
    to the rest of the nation's salaries, the teacher salaries must be=20
    "annualized" -- converted from a school year to a 12 month =
scale.</FONT>=20
    </P></LI></UL>
  <LI>
  <P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000><B>Extra Pay</B>: These =
salary figures=20
  also don't include extra pay for coaching sports, knowledge bowl, =
directing=20
  jazz band, etc. </FONT>
  <UL>
    <LI>
    <P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>This extra compensation can =
be=20
    significant (48% again the teacher's base salary!).</FONT> </P>
    <LI>
    <P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>Note: I've <U>not</U> taken =
into=20
    consideration this "extra pay" in the compensated calculations =
below. It has=20
    been next to impossible to get that data from MSD; but it is=20
    significant.</FONT> </P></LI></UL></LI></UL>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>Because of their shorter work =
year and=20
shorter workday,&nbsp; teachers earn more than many other educated=20
professionals:</FONT></P>
<P><A href=3D"http://www.educationnext.org/20033/71.html" =
name=3Dfig1><IMG=20
height=3D374 alt=3D"Figure 1" src=3D"images/71fig1.gif" width=3D800 =
border=3D0></A></P>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>When you include the 28.6% =
benefits, other=20
"opportunity costs" (teaching Summer School; other work/vacation =
opportunities),=20
the corrected salary grid looks as follows:</FONT></P>
<P><A href=3D"images/Picture1a.jpg" target=3D_blank><IMG height=3D547=20
src=3D"images/Picture1a.jpg" width=3D800 border=3D0></A></P>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>So what we really have is the =
following:=20
Average MSD teacher compensation package (including benefits, annualized =
salary,=20
bonuses, etc): $63,663.</FONT></P>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>And the distribution looks like =
this:=20
</FONT></P>
<P><A href=3D"images/Picture4.jpg" target=3D_Blank><IMG height=3D499=20
src=3D"images/Picture4.jpg" width=3D800 border=3D0></A></P>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>Despite protestations by the =
NEA, neither=20
US nor Idaho teachers are poverty stricken. The annualized adjustment, =
including=20
compensation, show that 76% of MSD government school teachers are making =
between=20
$65,000 and $90,000 per year. Compare this to the fact that the <A=20
href=3D"http://www.labor.state.id.us/lmi/pubs/idempnews/iecur.pdf">per =
capita=20
personal income</A> for Idaho was $25,057; for Latah County it was =
$21,716 (in=20
1991).</FONT></P>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>Finally -- why is it important =
that we deal=20
with teachers' salaries? Because those salaries account for the largest =
portion=20
of the government school budget. If we are to get a handle on spending, =
we have=20
to deal with the largest contributor to spending -- teachers'=20
salaries.</FONT></P>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000>Jack Wenders (Professor or =
Economics,=20
University of Idaho) explains the effects that we see above:</FONT></P>
<HR>

Dear Dale: Thank you for =
sending me=20
your observations about Moscow School District's (MSD) teachers' pay. It =
is well=20
done. I have a few comments that may help your readers understand what =
is going=20
on here.=20
<OL>
 <LI>
 It is important to understand =
how=20
 teachers' salaries are determined. MSD has a salary grid which rewards =
only=20
 college degrees and credits (in eight steps) and longevity (in ten =
steps).=20
 Amazingly, teacher classroom performance and teaching field have =
nothing to do=20
 with how well a teacher is paid. After a very short probationary =
period,=20
 teachers progress up the grid automatically with longevity, even if =
the grid=20
 remains constant. This is in stark contrast to how pay is determined =
in the=20
 private sector, and at the university level, including UI, where there =
are no=20
 grids, and pay differs by teaching field and performance. The bottom =
end of=20
 the 2002-03 MSD salary grid is $25,000 ($32,150 with benefits) for a =
first=20
 year beginning teacher w/ a BA/BS. There are 80 cells in the grid, and =
the=20
 single top cell is $48,835 ($62,802 with benefits). &nbsp; =

 <LI>
 In MSD, there are 165 =
teachers at or=20
 above the bottom cell in 2002-03. Seventy-four, or 44.8%, of MSD's =
teachers=20
 are in the single top cell--$48,835 ($62,802 with benefits). Further, =
123, or=20
 74.5%, of the teachers have topped-out in the longevity dimension of =
the grid=20
 and are located in the top five longevity cells (out of 180). The =
average=20
 salary is $42,842 ($55,094 with benefits), and the median (83rd) =
salary is=20
 $44,634 ($57,399 with benefits). The range on the grid is $25k to =
$48.8k, but=20
 both the mean and median are much closer to the top. In an even, or=20
 rectangular, distribution, the mean and median salary would be about =
$36.9k=20
 ($47.5k with benefits). What really stands out is the degree to which =
teachers=20
 are packed at the top end of the grid. &nbsp; 
 <LI>
 In MSD, 89.7% of the teachers =
making at=20
 least $25k in base salary are tenured. As I read the relevant statute =
[Idaho=20
 Code 33-514], teachers receive tenure after two years' probation. In =
most=20
 universities, tenure is not achieved until after seven years =
probation, and=20
 there are many non-tenure track positions. Aside from teachers' aides, =
there=20
 are almost no non-tenure track teaching positions in public education =
or at=20
 MSD. In my view, achieving a life-time appointment after only a couple =
of=20
 years is a much too short probationary period. &nbsp; 
 <LI>
 In MSD, 46.1% of the teachers =
have a=20
 MA/MS/MEd degree or more. This is actually down from 1993-94 when =
61.9% of the=20
 teachers had a MA/MS/MEd degree or more. For the state as a whole, the =

comparable number is 19.2% for 2002-03. (MSD's pay grid has a "BA/BS + =
30=20
 credits" step where there are quite a few teachers: 39 teachers are at =
the top=20
 of this step alone. Many apparently take this route up the grid rather =
than=20
 the MA/MS/MEd route.) &nbsp; 
 <LI>
 In MSD, 35.9% of the teachers =
are older=20
 than fifty. For the state as a whole, the comparable number is 33.0%. =
For both=20
 MSD and the state, this percentage has grown by over 70% in the past =
ten=20
 years--up 72% for MSD and up 78% for the state as a =
whole. &nbsp;=20
 
 <LI>
 In MSD, 30.2% of the teachers =
had=20
 longevity over 20 years. For the state as a whole, the comparable =
figure is=20
 26.4%. Over the past ten years, for MSD this figure has grown almost =
twice as=20
 fast as for the state as a whole--up 28% as compared to up 16% for the =
state=20
 as a whole. &nbsp; 
 <LI>
 The upward trend in both age =
and=20
 longevity is understated somewhat for both MSD and the state since =
teacher=20
 numbers have been growing over the past ten years--up 8.3% for MSD and =
up=20
 15.4% for the state. &nbsp; 
 <LI>
 What is going on here is =
roughly the=20
 following. Over the past decade or so, with steep gradients in the =
salary=20
 grid, MSD teachers started near the bottom of the grid, attained =
tenure=20
 quickly, and then rode the steep longevity and education gradients to =
the top=20
 salary in no more than ten years. The result has been very low teacher =

turnover and a bloated, top-heavy, pay structure. For example, a grid =
that had=20
 top-pay reached in, say, 20 longevity steps instead of 10 would have =
increased=20
 turnover and saved a lot of salary money over the years, without any =
loss in=20
 teacher performance. And teachers would have been more evenly =
distributed over=20
 the pay grid. Put another way, no private business, or organization, =
would=20
 have most employees at the top end of the pay scale the way MSD does. =
Recall=20
 that 123, or 74.5%, of the teachers are in the top five (out of 80) =
longevity=20
 cells. It is all the more irrational since the criteria for pay=20
 raises--longevity and additional college credits--have almost nothing =
to do=20
 with improved student performance. &nbsp; 
 <LI>
 Regarding the longevity =
dimension of=20
 teacher pay. It is often argued that teacher performance improves with =

experience. This is true, up to a point. Research shows that only the =
first=20
 four or five years of teacher experience has a payoff in student =
performance.=20
 After that, additional experience doesn't matter, and there is also =
evidence=20
 that some teachers burn-out later in their careers when their =
performance=20
 declines. This also means that tenure is awarded well before teachers =
reach=20
 their potential. So tenure is rewarded before administrators know how =
a=20
 teacher is going to turn out. (Again, note that tenure in universities =
is=20
 typically awarded only after seven years experience when much more is =
known=20
 about how the teacher will turn out, and after that pay can be =
adjusted to=20
 reflect performance, unlike in the public schools.) Think of how =
absurd it is=20
 to have tenure and pay policies where an employee at age 25 receives =
tenure=20
 for life with no possibility of being rewarded or penalized for good =
or bad=20
 performance. Where in the private sector does this happen? Tenure, in =
and of=20
 itself, is not that bad. In Universities, tenured professors who go to =
sleep=20
 can go for years without pay raises. Not so in public education. =
There, tenure=20
 in combination with an inflexible pay grid locks in and rewards =
teachers=20
 irrespective of performance. Such a system of pay determination is =
simply=20
 irrational from the standpoint of human resource =
management. &nbsp;=20
 
 <LI>
 Regarding pedagogy education. =
There is a=20
 lot of evidence that shows that education courses, credits, and =
degrees have=20
 nothing to do with teacher performance, and thus it makes no sense to =
have pay=20
 determined by such factors. The most important teacher =
characteristics, from=20
 the standpoint of student performance, are: brains (verbal cognitive =
ability),=20
 a few years experience, and a MA degree (or concentration) in one's =
teaching=20
 field at the secondary level. Teachers themselves regularly cite =
student=20
 teaching as the most important education course they've taken. All the =
rest is=20
 off the radar screen as a determinant of student performance. Yet the =
way in=20
 which teachers are rewarded has almost no connection with these=20
 characteristics. Further, many MEd degrees are given in the field of =
education=20
 administration, a degree which, by design, is not relevant to =
classroom=20
 teaching, yet it counts on the salary grid. Almost all higher degrees =
in=20
 education are pursued purely to climb the salary grid, not to improve=20
 teaching--because they don't. &nbsp; 
 <LI>
 While it is often instructive =
to=20
 annualize teachers' pay for the purpose of comparing it with other =
kinds of=20
 performance, as you have done, in my view the best way to get a handle =
on=20
 public school teachers' relative pay is to compare it to comparable =
private=20
 schools' teachers' pay. This is what is commonly done in other areas =
of=20
 government employment where the Bureau of Labor Statistics regularly =
gathers=20
 private sector pay for determining government pay for accountants, =
computer=20
 programmers, engineers, etc. Note that the NEA, IEA, etc, never make=20
 comparisons with private sector teachers' pay, for fear of what will =
be found.=20
 The trick used by the teachers' unions in Idaho and elsewhere is to =
compare=20
 public school teachers' pay with that of public school teachers in =
other=20
 states where pay is similarly bloated and top-heavy. Since labor =
markets are=20
 invariably determined by local market conditions, market pay =
differentials=20
 within the same profession vary widely across regions. While Idaho's =
teacher=20
 pay ranks about 37th among the states--this rises about 10 places when =

relative pension match and cost of living are considered, Idaho's per =
capita=20
 personal income ranks about 43-44th among the states. Thus, relative =
to=20
 Idaho's regional personal incomes, Idaho's teachers on the whole are =
paid=20
 relatively well.) </LI></OL>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; When =
public/private=20
teachers' pay comparisons are made, here is what is=20
found. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Using data from the 1987-88 National =
Center for=20
Educational Statistics (NCES) Schools and Staffing survey, Ballou and =
Podgursky=20
found average public and private school teacher salaries to be $26,458 =
and=20
$17,434 respectively. In these data, an adjustment was made for teachers =
who=20
were members of religious orders by excluding all Catholic teachers who =
were=20
never married. This shows that private salaries are on the average 65.9% =
of=20
those in public schools. Similarly, in 1993-94 another study found =
private=20
school salaries to be 64% of public school =
teachers'. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Both=20
these data sets ignore benefits, such as health insurance and retirement =

contributions, which are much higher in the public school sector. =
Benefits are=20
about 31.3% of salary in the public sector as a whole and 15.8% in the =
private=20
sector. A study for Pennsylvania found that teachers' benefits as a =
percentage=20
of total salary to be 36.1%, and for comparable employees in the private =
sector=20
benefits were 23%. Benefits averaged 26.2% of salary for US public =
school=20
teachers from 1994-995. Public school teachers' benefits are higher than =
in=20
private schools. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; These observations raise the =
issue of the=20
optimal--cost-minimizing--mix of teachers. Apparently, because private =
schools=20
are under competitive pressure in their retail markets, they do a better =
job of=20
choosing the optimal structural mix of teachers, thus producing an =
average=20
salary well below those of public schools. Michael Podgursky has =
addressed the=20
issue of pay comparability between public and private school teachers. =
Using a=20
sample of non-sectarian, non-specialized, private schools, and =
controlling for=20
sex, experience, education level, region and rural/urban status, he =
found that=20
across longevity "pay in private schools begins at 78 percent of public =
schools,=20
rises to 92 percent of public school pay by a teacher's twelfth year, =
and=20
declines thereafter." Truncating the public school sample to include =
only=20
suburban schools with very low poverty rates, which are comparable to =
private=20
schools in general, he found that "private schools teachers now start at =
76=20
percent of their public school counterparts. This rises to 87 percent by =
their=20
twelfth year and declines thereafter. . . . [T]he shape of the pay =
function=20
[over longevity] remains the same but simply shifts downward." The fact =
that=20
private schools have a teacher turnover and attrition rate about twice =
that of=20
the public schools indicates that private schools use both teacher =
"churn" and a=20
much flatter longevity dimension in salary structure to keep average pay =
down.=20
In contrast, early tenure and a back-loaded salary grid virtually =
guarantee that=20
the public schools will have low turnover and attrition and a much =
higher=20
concentration of faculty at the top of their higher salary grid, exactly =
like=20
the MSD data show. Aside from the fact that public schools pay =
comparable=20
faculty more, this structural difference adds to the higher average pay =
in=20
public schools. Simply put, private schools have an inter-temporal,=20
cost-minimizing longevity mix of teachers than the public schools, =
including=20
MSD.=20
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; For those =
interested in=20
reading further, you can look at:=20
<UL>
 <LI>
 Dale Ballou and Michael =
Podgursky,=20
 Teacher Pay and Teacher Quality (Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn =
Institute=20
 for Employment Research, 1997), Table 6.1, p. 131. 
 <LI>
 Donald H. McLaughlin and =
Stephen=20
 Broughman, Private Schools in the United States: A Statistical =
Profile=20
 (National Center for Education Statistics: Working Paper NCES 97-459, =
1997),=20
 Table 3.12, p. 93. 
 <LI>
 David J. Wynne and Charles W. =
Watters,=20
 "Teacher Compensation: How it Compares with the Private Sector" =
Government=20
 Union Review 12, No. 3 (Summer 1991), Table 2, p. 39. 
 <LI>
 Michael Podgursky, "Fringe =
Benefits"=20
 Education Next, Vol 3, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 71-76. (<A=20
 =
href=3D"http://www.educationnext.org/20033/71.html">http://www.educationn=
ext.org/20033/71.html</A>)=20
 </LI></UL>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The bottom line is the MDS =
teachers'=20
pay is both bloated and top-end loaded. This is due to two factors: (1) =
paying=20
most teachers well above their private counterparts in comparable =
schools, and=20
(2) having a top-end loaded distribution of teachers. For years, the MSD =
school=20
board has mismanaged both the level and structure of teachers' pay by =
its=20
failure to resist the demands of the MEA. Teachers' unions are dominated =
by=20
senior members who bargain primarily for their own benefit. The flip =
side of=20
this is that beginning teachers are largely ignored by union =
negotiators. In the=20
MSD salary grid, a beginning teacher does not receive any annual raise =
until the=20
fourth year of longevity. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Any way you cut it, =
MSD's=20
teachers are very well paid, and there are far too many at the very top =
of the=20
salary grid.=20
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; I hope these comments help =
clarify=20
your data and some of the underlying issues. I would be pleased to =
answer any=20
questions you might have at: <A=20
href=3D"mailto:jwenders@uidaho.edu">jwenders@uidaho.edu</A><FONT=20
color=3D#0000ff>.=20
Regards, Jack -- John T.=20
Wenders Professor of Economics, University of Idaho Senior Fellow, =
The=20
Commonwealth Foundation&nbsp; 
<HR>

More things to discuss in our ongoing =
conversations about=20
how to best improve education for Moscow's youth. Throwing more money at =
the=20
problem certainly is not the solution. 
Best, Dale Courtney Moscow,=20
Idaho</BODY></HTML>

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